Intro - 00:00:06: Welcome to The Biotech Startups Podcast by Excedr. Join us as we speak with first-time founders, serial entrepreneurs, and experienced investors about the challenges and triumphs of running a biotech startup from pre-seed to IPO with your host, Jon Chee. In part two, Philip cold-called his way into venture, learned that responsiveness and respect matter more than the best terms, and started building a real point of view on healthcare investing. If you missed it, go back to part two. In part three, Philip moves from venture to private equity, chasing profitable founder-owned businesses instead of long-shot bets. He walks through the deal that tested him hardest, a founder conflict that blew up a month in, a leadership change that he had to navigate, and why he'll always remember what his gut was telling him that week.
Jon Chee - 00:01:11: And so you've done two, three years at Frasier. Was there ever a time, like, I could spend my whole career here, or you're like, I wanna go into a different direction? When did you know it's time to leave?
Philip Borden - 00:01:21: Yeah. So when I talked my way into the job, it was always a, hey, this is not a partnership track position. I had always thought about from day one maybe business school would be a good thing to do at some point. And I also knew that I wanted to explore slightly more areas than just biotech and life science, you know, early-stage investing. And they were very supportive of that too. So I applied to a bunch of places for business school and ended up getting into Harvard. And so drove 3,000-some-odd miles on I-90 from Seattle to Boston, one road for 3,000 miles. Yeah. And started there.
Jon Chee - 00:01:55: That's an epic drive. It's really, it's an absolutely epic drive. When you got to Cambridge, you said there's like a similarity, kind of the kindred spirit element to like Seattle and like in Cambridge. What was it like at HBS? Obviously, they have a very—doing cases is a very uniquely HBS thing. Like, what was your experience like?
Philip Borden - 00:02:14: I loved my experience there. And what I liked so much about it was the case method. Like, I am actually a huge believer in the Socratic method and learning from experiences. Again, I was a science person that did a lot of book reading and memorization and lectures and, you know, a lot of lectures, big anonymous lectures. And in business school, hey, all of a sudden, I had to do the work beforehand, which is a new experience. You know, I had to read the case and like, you know, do a bunch of analysis. But more than that, I was expected to have some real thoughts on this. And if you don't, you could get cold-called, and that's terrifying. And so to me, the educational experience of the case method, the Socratic method, that to me was the best educational experience that I've ever had.
And again, if you think about, you know, we talked a little bit about how's AI gonna affect the future. Like, I'm a believer that, again, lectures and note-taking, like, you've got the world's best, you know, smartest computer in everyone's hand, but what you can't replicate is how do you contribute to a conversation in an effective way. You know, you've gotta prep in advance and come prepared. You know, those are the kinds of things that I think force a learning experience on you that I got so much from, and I'm a huge believer. My wife, you know, I actually met my wife while we were there. We're both in the same class. And ultimately, she's gone on to be a business school professor herself. She's at MIT Sloan, and she teaches exclusively the Socratic case study sort of variation on the case study method. So yeah.
Jon Chee - 00:03:43: Very cool. And I didn't go to HBS or business school, but when you go to business school, do you specialize?
Philip Borden - 00:03:49: Some schools do. You know, did I take a couple of healthcare-focused classes? Sure. But, you know, there's no major. There's nothing like that. I mean, but again, that was—I didn't mind that at all. I had a pretty narrow set of experiences. And part of the education is creating this corpus of knowledge of 500 cases that you have to read about and, you know, everything from DeWalt Power Tools to Ducati Motorcycles to Aetna Healthcare, you know, whatever. And I think there's real learning that takes place even things outside of healthcare because you can see how things might apply or frankly not apply to it.
But I liked having this kind of broader-based thing. I mean, again, think about my experience before going in there. I'd seen a lot of investing. You know, I developed a good knowledge around that, but like, what did I know about sales and marketing? I literally zero. What did I know about operations? I mean, less than zero. I walked into my first day of my operations class and I was like, operations? What is this? What is this? What's a cycle time? What's a—you know, like, there's just a whole bunch of things that it created a more rounded experience than, you know, than what I was ever gonna get from just staying in one particular industry.
Jon Chee - 00:04:54: Very cool. And so it sounds like you're getting a bunch of exposure to different size companies, different industries. As you were wrapping up your business school experience, was there a specific industry that like gravitated to you? Did you wanna get back into investing? Where was your head on?
Philip Borden - 00:05:09: Well, I learned a lot from a bunch of the different cases. Again, I had such an awesome experience at Frasier that I kind of thought going in that's what I'd really like to return to. Again, I'm more than happy to be able to kind of drink from the well and be able to sample lots of different things. But at the end of the day, like, I still really loved what I was doing, healthcare investing. And I think the other thing that I learned, maybe this is hindsight's 20/20, but healthcare is a weird place. Within healthcare, you've got third-party payers, you know, which is really weird. You've got an FDA process. You've got all sorts of technology that's like super nuanced. And so if I could develop this kind of expertise, and I'll use quotes purposely on that—again, I'm mid, late twenties at this point—but if I could develop this kind of area of expertise in this weird area, you know, with a lot of nuance that requires you to know a bunch of three-letter acronyms and, you know, phase one, phase two, phase three clinical trials and what does that mean? And, you know, that could be a way to make me stand out or to differentiate my own career to be able to develop that.
So I think when I got to HBS, again, I had lots of super smart classmates, but a lot of folks are way smarter than me. But a lot of them would say, oh, you're a healthcare guy. You know healthcare. Tell me about whatever. And it felt like this large barrier to entry almost to think about it in strategy terms that I had from my experience at Frasier in having the cell and molecular biology background. So I felt like I wanted to lean into that even more coming out and continue to do what I love.
Jon Chee - 00:06:40: And so when you're trying to find that opportunity, was it like a matter of picking up the phone again?
Philip Borden - 00:06:44: It wasn't quite as scrappy, but I graduated in, what, '03, I guess. Pretty crummy time, and 9/11 happened my first week and a half there at school. So, you know, so that experience, obviously, you know, pretty formative. The economy wasn't all that great, but I had this kind of good background that allowed me to find a job in investing. And by that time, I got engaged looking to kinda settle down. And, frankly, I needed a job because I had a mountain of student debt. So...
Jon Chee - 00:07:08: Yeah. So where did you end up investing post-HBS?
Philip Borden - 00:07:12: I started at Oxford Bioscience Partners. It's a venture capital firm here in Boston. No longer is around. It was an interesting contrast in some ways to Frasier in that really smart folks, they had made lots of big bets on the genomics revolution. That was their focus at the time, and everyone thought, oh, if we crack the human genome, you know, we'll be able to solve everything. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It didn't exactly turn out that way, but I took a position with them. But it was interesting because they had made a lot of relatively big bets. And I think my first six months or a year there continued that strong pace, and then it was put the brakes on. They hadn't returned as much capital. You know, the exit markets were tough. And for me as a, you know, as a young person, obviously, the thing I wanna—you know, I wanna work on new opportunities, and that's where the most learning takes place. And so it was also at that time that I transitioned from the pure venture world into private equity. So picking these early-stage companies, man, is it hard.
Jon Chee - 00:08:08: Yeah.
Philip Borden - 00:08:09: You're kind of basing this off of, yes, there's pattern recognition of founder background and evaluation of the science and the evidence that's there. But the ability for early-stage investing to yield to analysis is tough, and there's a lot of failures too, a really high failure rate. And I also think constitutionally, like, I struggled with those failures. You have investments that you believed in and you wanted to convince your partners to invest in, and they don't work out. Oh, God. You remember your failures more than you do your successes, and this is a business that just has a high failure rate.
And so I took a bit of a risk, and I joined Riverside Partners at that time. And I was employee number three, I think, and they were hoping to raise a new fund, but it was a private equity firm focused on healthcare and technology, and I was hired as the healthcare guy. I'm now 30, 31, 32, and it was great in that I got a lot of responsibility early on, but I was able to kind of move into investing in healthcare companies that were different because they were revenue-generating. They were profitable businesses. You could evaluate more than someone's background and a, you know, a scientific slide deck. You could look at real customers. You could look at the margins and thing—you know, things that I think, you know, resonated a bit more with me and had a slightly lower failure rate too, which I think fit me better.
Jon Chee - 00:09:24: I always think about investing just broadly speaking is just like, there's gotta be like an investment style match with your personality. And I know a lot of folks who are like at the bench or like wrapping up postdoc or PhD, and they're like, I wanna go into venture investing. And I'm like, cool. Gotta realize that like that's one style of investing, but you're signing up for a certain lifestyle of investing. Something that you said that stood out to me is it's heartbreaking when you have those failures. I am really concerned when investors don't care about those failures because like then it's just a spreadsheet game, and that's like disrespectful to the founder who like poured everything into this. And if you stop caring—and I think that's a problem in every industry, every messaging has problems. But when we think about like venture returns and just like power law, unless this thing is a SpaceX, everything's a dud. But you realize all of those founders poured their blood, sweat, and tears, and life force into this thing. That's rough.
Philip Borden - 00:10:19: Given the power laws that exist in ventures where you can have a 100 plus x return on a single investment and you got a lot of failures in that one one hundred. You know, there's a rational investment strategy that says, hey, just make a lot of bets and don't get so emotionally tied up in any of them, frankly. And when you see something really taking off, that's the one to only focus on. But that was a mismatch with my personality. I convinced a founder to trust me. I convinced someone to take my money and have me serve, help them in any way I could and serve on the board and those kinds of things. And so that mismatch was tough, but it's—I know there are venture capitalists who have that approach, and frankly, there's rationality to it.
Jon Chee - 00:10:57: Yeah. It's like super hard. And it's like, for those who are wanting to get into venture, you just gotta realize like it's governed by the power law. Generally speaking, you need multiple fund returners. And also like if you're an entrepreneur who's looking to raise venture, realize that there is a power law at play. Right? It's kind of like you gotta know the kind of the counterparties. What are they optimizing for? Right? And I think venture does the best marketing out of any investment style. Like, they get the most airtime. So it sounds glamorous, but just take a look at it and make sure it fits your style. Because like I think when I was early on, I was like, yeah, I think I could do venture. I went the opposite direction. I'm like in credit. I'm like, this is way better. Like, way, way better.
And look, I think from our perspective, the way we try to be different is that we take a venture lens to our like our extensions of credit, whereas like all my friends who are in banking, just like cash flow or nothing. Like, so I try to keep the venture spirit alive in what we do, but it's just like stylistically as if for like this investment style is like, no way. Like, I feel my stomach turning. Like, I can't go to bed. Like, I'm just like—and I was like thinking about like, oh, like my grandmother and father are very anxious people. I'm like, why would I think that I was cut out to do like any sort of venture investing? This is not for me. So you made this transition to private equity. Were these like LBOs, growth equity, kind of like what was the style of private equity investing?
Philip Borden - 00:12:22: It was much more of an LBO style. So we would invest in revenue-generating profitable businesses. Again, difference number one from venture, revenue-generating profitable. Two, they were control investments. So, you know, in the venture world, you've got a syndicate, you partner up with your buddies, and I'll be honest, I didn't love that part of venture either because your interests and your partner's interests may not always line up. And so if I'm taking a control position, I can make mistakes, but at least they're gonna be mine and I'm not gonna be tied up from somebody else. So I liked that piece. And then third, which had some characteristics of the venture world, these were all founder-owned businesses that we were investing in. But most of the time, they hadn't taken any third-party capital before. So these were founders who had bootstrapped them. You know, they were like you, Jon. They talked their way into a loan early on. They had gone to second mortgage, credit card debt, the spouse that's upset with all the risk that they took. You know? So it did have that element to it in terms of the style, but all healthcare oriented.
And a lot of what I ended up investing in were suppliers to the life science world. So the strategy that we sort of employed was a little bit of like selling picks and shovels to the gold miners, you know, for a cliche. But it's true that was what we ended up investing in. So things like CROs, contract manufacturers of various kinds, some software that was suppliers too. So those kinds of businesses were what I gravitated towards where I could use some of that background and knowledge of the biotech, med device, life science world from venture, but in businesses that were more profitable and lower risk of failure.
Jon Chee - 00:13:56: Yep. Absolutely. And you said you're employee three there?
Philip Borden - 00:14:00: Yeah. I was employee three there, and we ended up raising a pool of capital. Riverside was lucky enough to get some like amazing top-tier investors right off the bat, which, by the way, I had nothing to do with. My partners did, you know, really great job of building the firm. And again, I got lucky in some ways there. Off the bat, we were able to raise a nice pool of capital and begin to deploy that. And what was great about the position for me is that I was suddenly the healthcare guy, which is like half of what the firm was doing. And so it wasn't that I was leading my own deals from day one, but I was able to build out the healthcare practice there. So we did things like building out a healthcare advisory board that brought in a bunch of experts and folks that we could draw on. We hired a bunch of people. I mean, the best part about Riverside for me was building that team, hiring folks, mentoring them, eventually got enough experience to be able to train some folks in what we were up to, and that's the part that I loved. That was really the most rewarding part.
Jon Chee - 00:14:58: Very cool. There's so many directions I wanna go here. I guess the first one is when you're, you know, a third team member of a firm, you're probably wearing all the hats. And if you're a three-person firm, you're basically like a startup. You are a startup. How do you source deals for an LBO control investment with a three-person firm? Is that picking up the phone?
Philip Borden - 00:15:20: Is it traveling? So one of the three of us was focused on deal sourcing, and that was not me. We'd have one person who would be sourcing deals through phone books and Google searches and going through—trust me, it wasn't JPMorgan. It was some tiny little investment bank or some little advisory firm or an accountant who knew a guy. Those are the kinds of businesses that we tended to invest in. They were kind of under the radar, family-owned, founder and family-owned businesses where sometimes they had their entire net worth tied up in this business, which is a terrifying thing. They've done really well, but at this point, they want to mitigate their risk a little bit, and the good founders know, hey, there's some things that I could probably learn too and ways in which I could use some help. And those are the kinds of folks that we'd most want to work with because we could hopefully add a little something to what they were doing.
So, you know, really good example of that. Most of the time, founders were awesome at one thing, but like lacked other things. So sales and marketing sometimes was like super weak and just some of the basic systems and processes. I mean, some folks didn't have CRM, didn't think about what the ideal customer profile for them looked like, pricing discipline. I mean, there's just some of those basics were areas where we could help. And so, BioAgilytix was one of the investments that I made while I was there, and that's a perfect example. I mean, they were a group that had grown because they had great science there. There's a group of scientists that came out of GSK, and they had amazing scientists, had done some great bespoke work for GSK when they spun out, but a narrow customer base and no sales and no marketing. It was incredibly narrow. And so that's what we worked with them on from day one was how do you develop a sales and marketing force for this bioanalytical work that they were looking to build up, you know, that drove a lot of the value that again, it wasn't necessarily my insight, but the CEO and the team, you know, really diving in and embracing those changes, that was the key driver in generating what was the best return of my career.
Jon Chee - 00:17:19: So sweet. Were the founders scientists?
Philip Borden - 00:17:21: Yeah. So it was a really interesting founder story. I mean, there was a founder and then a partner, and the partner was kind of the CEO, and the founder was the CSO, and they were both meaningful owners in the business. And I was really excited about this investment. Again, it was kind of at the very beginning of the outsource bioanalytical being outsourced. Everyone was doing it in-house before, and I thought, man, this is the kind of thing that really should be outsourced for a whole bunch of reasons. And this is a beautiful business model because companies stay with you for a long period of time. There's high switching costs, a lot to like. But the two founders had some conflict, and in fact, within the first month that I was there, one of them said to me, you know, it's me or him. Oh. You know? And so we immediately kind of had to navigate a really challenging transition of leadership that was totally unexpected when we made the investment.
And it, you know, again, you think about things you get right and get wrong. I mean, this is my first fully solo Philip deal that I did at Riverside where I led it from start to finish. And I had to talk to my partners about what antibody-based studio testing was and like all this, you know, biomarkers were like some of my scientist-oriented partners like what being what this was. And then like a month in, we've got this management crisis that we're having to deal with. And so that was incredibly scary, but again, my partners were supportive. We ended up finding a terrific CEO to come in and partner with the CSO. A guy named Jim Dayton came in and partnered with Afshin Safavi to lead the organization, and Jim continued to run it for the next, gosh, decade or so and turned it into a billion-dollar-plus exit. And so it was a terrifying time at the beginning, and it just kind of goes to show, yeah, I said these companies yield to analysis. Well, I know this didn't yield to analysis. We had a crisis so early on that we didn't expect, but you know, we just kept working the problem. Okay. How do we find someone who can come in and provide some stabilizing leadership? How do we build out the sales team there? How do we kind of build this market? And it ended up working out really well.
Jon Chee - 00:19:20: I was gonna say, I mean, like, again, it just seems like drinking out of the fire hose in terms of learning experience, especially on your first like start to finish deal. There was this someone saying, most companies die by suicide, not by homicide. It's basically this internal the strife that can be company-ending.
Philip Borden - 00:19:39: It really could have—it was tough. And I remember that this period of time really well. I mean, I came home from the meeting where we had to let go of the CEO, and I got off the plane. And my wife picked me up at the airport and she looked at me and said, are you alright? I said, you know, my stomach really doesn't feel good and let's go to MGH. And it turned out like I had a burst appendix that I was working through that like is about a grapefruit-sized ball of infection that I had in my stomach that had been going on for a while. So immediately after that, I was then knocked out for—and I couldn't go into work for about four or five weeks while I was dealing with this. So there was a lot of things kinda happening all at once from the first appendix and my first DM pulling, you know, like...
Jon Chee - 00:20:17: The universe is just conspiring.
Philip Borden - 00:20:20: And again, it's easy to look back on this now because that deal worked out fantastically well for me and our investors. But yeah, I mean, look, sometimes like it is not a straight line, man. You know, that things can go in wildly unexpected directions. And, you know, like, that's happened here at LabShares at times too, but it's really kind of how you handle those situations, how do you rely on the rest of your team, how you present to everyone else as to how you figure your way through those kind of—
Jon Chee - 00:20:48: Moments? Absolutely. I was listening to Invest Like the Best, and one of my favorite guest episodes, I think his name's Jeremy Griffin. I think he did a second one, just recently. Really good, really sharp guy, really just like orthogonal like thinker. But in like one of his like first interviews, he had something that was, I thought, a very astute way or observation. It's along the lines of like, everything is never just straight up into the right. There's gonna be this up and down. But you guys are talking about like when you're like looking for someone to invest in or, you know, partner with. Just can you like try to get a sense if they've ever like been on their knees and taken like a big fall before and gone back up? Because like you can tell like when someone's been humbled, like properly humbled and gone through something really hard. And I can think of many times where I was just like, oh my god, I was gonna throw the towel in on that. But if you manage to get through it and push through it, oh my god. Like, it's like a muscle. It's just—but you gotta get through it, and it sucks. Like, it absolutely sucks.
Philip Borden - 00:21:49: Yeah. It really is. And again, I think those kinds of things, I think, you know, definitely were really formative for me as well. I definitely feel like I'm a better and more empathetic manager in some ways, you know, and leader today because not everything has been exactly perfect. And one of the things I'm trying to do more of is sharing with my team, you know, some of those things too because everybody has stuff that's personal or career. Everyone has some things that they really struggle with, and I think in a business context, sometimes people think, oh, that's not appropriate. Like, they don't want to share. Like, I actually think that's one of the ways that you build the most trust with your team is sharing, I screwed something up. I screwed things up with this customer, or this is a bad decision, and it's being vulnerable, but you are not vulnerable for doing so. And unfortunately, we've got some leaders today, including in the White House, who have the exact opposite perspective. Never show weakness. Like I actually think that people overall resonate more if you're willing to share, hey, here's some times where things haven't gone well, where I made mistakes and, you know, got through it okay and then hopefully learn something from it.
Jon Chee - 00:22:51: Yeah. Absolutely. And I totally agree. Like, I think it is a big red flag, at least for me, when someone can't admit some sort of like oopsie. And like because it just like, how do you learn? Like, if you never think you're wrong, you're just like, you can't course correct. And two, it's just like exactly what you said, it garners trust. And when you have like a high trust system, then you start really cooking, and you can start moving fast, and you're like not second guessing, and it's just like really you're starting to like move at a velocity that like—like, I've been in organizations where it was like low trust. Like, people always watching over their shoulder in sort of this law firm. Like, you know, everyone's out on their own. That's rough. I need to like—look, there are some like environments that do really well with those types of cultures, not somewhere I wanna work, but the organizations that I really look up to have these like high trust. And definitely, you have to be able to admit vulnerability because everyone at a certain point is.
I love that lesson. And you're at Riverside. You're basically drinking out of the fire hose. You had a very early like management lesson. I guess in another aspect of firm building, were you out raising funds from LPs?
Philip Borden - 00:24:05: Yeah. Not that first round, but subsequent funds, yeah. I spent a lot of time in front of the LP community, and it was the first time the proverbial tables got turned where you're going out hat in hand looking for capital. And not only that, but like, I mean, you just think about like what you're asking of an LP. What you're asking of an LP is make a ten, maybe fifteen-year commitment to me. I'm not going to tell you anything that we're going to do in advance. You have no influence over what we end up doing, you know, effectively. And short of like the world caving in and all of the partners dying in a plane crash, you can't pull your money out or do it. You know, it is a huge ask that you make to the investor community when you do that. And so, yeah, that was a real learning experience as well. It was really my first true kind of selling experience. How do we at Riverside position the firm as a differentiated strategy? How do we add value in a way that's not just window dressing, but show me ways in which you've really helped to change the trajectory of companies and generated alpha, you know, in their parlance for us as investors? So that was a really great learning experience. And we also got some people who never returned our call, some people who were complete jerks to us. And so sitting on that other side of the table, like, you ate some humble pie.
Jon Chee - 00:25:24: Yeah. And it's like, and that's how you become empathetic. You're just like, look. You can realize and also too, just like, there's a flip, you know. Like, out here, sometimes the tables flip, and it always goes back and forth. Like, sometimes the VCs are the gatekeepers.
Philip Borden - 00:25:39: Yeah. In control. Yeah.
Jon Chee - 00:25:40: Yeah. In control, and then the founders are sometimes in control. So it just goes back and forth into perpetuity, like forever. It's like this cyclical thing, but it's just like, you gotta realize that investors gotta raise capital too. Founders have to raise capital too. Not so different. And I'm always curious about like raising funds from LPs, the different pools of capital, like how they're different. Were you guys like raising from endowments, pensions, insurance companies, sovereigns? Like, what was your guys' core like LP base? And like what did you guys look for in an LP base?
Philip Borden - 00:26:12: Yeah. So that evolved quite a bit over time. So when we started the first fund that I raised, again, I take zero credit for this, but our anchor investor was Yale and David Swensen. So like that was like the bluest of the blue chip as a lead investor, and that fund was heavy in the foundation endowment world, which at the time everyone was like, that's who you want as your investor. They're long term. Yale has been there for about three hundred and whatever years like they're not going anywhere. So that's how the LP pool started.
Now, over time though, that did evolve because it turned out that the foundation endowment world, we then hit the great financial crisis of '08, '09, 2010, and the liquidity crunch hit the foundations and endowments as much or harder than other folks. So we had to expand out that investor base over the subsequent funds. And frankly, the perception was, well, the foundations are the most valuable. It was good to have a more diversified base because different asset allocators have different pressures at different times and you want some of that diversification over time. So it definitely evolved, and I think that was a fortuitous one. We'd rather just kind of stay there, but I think it was good that we've got a broader investment base.
We raised the next fund then in 2009, I think. And again, a lot of folks don't remember just how deep of a depression that really was at that time. I mean, one of the deals that I ended up investing in is a medical products company, and we invested in March 2009. And in that quarter, there were two deals in the entire private equity world that were done, and we did one of them because it was incredibly kind of steady business, a lot of recurring revenue. We felt really good about the underlying dynamics of this, and we were able to make that and a few other investments at a time in the market where we were able to pay several turns of EBITDA less than what we would have otherwise needed to. And that turned out to be a really good decision, and I think timing of cycles has a lot to do with ultimate returns. We made some good-sized bets at a time where not a lot of folks were investing.
Outro - 00:28:22: That's it for part three with Philip Borden. Next time, Philip closes the loop. After more than twenty years of investing, he reconnects with an old poker buddy, gets pulled into a company solving a problem he'd watched biotechs get wrong for decades, and decides to stop backing operators and become one himself, buying LabShares and getting a brutal welcome on day one. If this series is landing for you, pass it along to someone building in biotech. See you in the finale. The Biotech Startups Podcast is produced by Excedr. Don't want to miss an episode? Search for The Biotech Startups Podcast wherever you get your podcasts and click subscribe. Excedr provides research labs with equipment leases on founder-friendly terms to support paths to exceptional outcomes. To learn more, visit our website, www.excedr.com. On behalf of the team here at Excedr, thanks for listening. The Biotech Startups Podcast provides general insights into the life science sector through the experiences of its guests. The use of information on this podcast or materials linked from the podcast is at the user's own risk. The views expressed by the participants are their own and are not the views of Excedr or sponsors. No reference to any product, service, or company in the podcast is an endorsement by Excedr or its guests.
